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ARTICLE
MORALITY AND ANIMALS
During the last fifteen or
twenty years, there have been a
number of groups (somewhat mislead
ingly called "liberation movements")
which have urged that the rights of
women, blacks, and homosexuals have
not been properly respected. Now
these three have been joined by the
animal liberation movement. In
terms of the actual pain involved,
the number of deaths, and even in
terms of the amount of confinement,
a good case can be made that animals
are treated even worse than women,
blacks and homosexuals. For
example, in a single year in the
United States alone at least sixty
million animals are used as subjects
for experimentation - most of whom
are used (and usually killed) to
test the safety of luxury products
such as new cosmetics. Animals are
subjected to confinement in factory
farms where a hen, for example, is
likely to be kept permanently in a
cage in which it cannot even stretch
its wings. Do human beings really
have the right to kill animals so that
we can eat their flesh - particularly
when we bear in mind that feeding
grain to animals before we eat them
rather than eating the grain directly
is an exceedingly inefficient way
of feeding human beings?
The case of the animal libbers
seems impressive but it has
encountered determined opposition.
In the matter of animal experiments
it is objected that at least those
cases where the experiments may
lead to the prevention and cure of
human ailments, we should recognize
that animal pain counts far less
than human pain so that even if the
experiments cause a greater total
amount of suffering to animals than
they prevent in human beings, they can

still be perfectly justifiable. Some
would even claim that it is justifiable
to test new luxury goods, such as
cosmetics, on animals. (The standard
test is to inject increasingly large
amounts of the substance into a group
of animals until half of them die,
sometimes simply because of the volume
of stuff that has been injected.)
Their argument could start with the
premise that while the interests of
animals should be respected, whenever
there is a conflict between the
interests of animals and the interests
of human beings, the interests of
human beings should take precedence.
If then it is in the interests of
human beings to make the new cosmetics
(consumers enjoy them, manufacturers
make money and workers gain employment),
it follows that, however painful the
experiments may be for the animals
they are still justifiable.
Or again it might be argued that
we don't really know that animals are
capable of feeling pain: after all,
you can't feel an animal's pain so you
can't be sure that it is suffering. In
the matter of breeding animals to kill
and use for meat, it has been argued
that since they wouldn't have been born
if a farmer hadn't planned eventually
to use them for meat and since it is
better to have even a short life than
none at all, raising animals for meat
is, at the very least, unobjectionable,
and in all probability commendable,
even from the point of view of the
animals themselves. Finally, it is
sometimes claimed that animals are by
their very nature incapable of having
rights (although this claim is not
quite as bleak as it appears for
animal interests because those who make
the claim usually hold as well that it
is wrong to do certain things to
animals and that we even have obliga
tions to do some things for them).
Is animal pain less important than
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human pain?
Almost all of us start out think
ing that it is. I do not mean by this
that we think (quite rightly) that
there are kinds of mental suffering
that human beings can undergo that
animals can't. I mean rather that
given what seem at least to be
roughly equal amounts of human
suffering and animal suffering, the
human suffering strikes us as vastly
more important. For example, if we
learn that animals are being experi
mented on in order to test a new
drug that may alleviate human
suffering, we don't tend to worry
about whether the chances are that
more human suffering will be pre
vented than is being caused to the
animals. If the experiments were to
be conducted on human beings, how
ever, we would react differently: we
would probably not be willing to
approve such experiments unless we
supposed that they would prevent a
great deal more suffering than they
caused and even then, many of us
wouldn't approve of it.
How could the view that animal
pain is less important than human
pain be defended? For most of us the
initial response would be that
because human beings are much more
intelligent than animals, animal pain
should count far less than human pain.
It's not, we suppose, that we are
playing favorites with our own species
in the way that a racist favors his
own race or a sexist favors his or
her own sex. It is not that we have
taken something that is morally
neutral like sex or skin color and
treated it as if it were morally
relevant, thereby favoring our own
kind just because they are our own
kind. We think rather that we have
observed a crucial difference
between human beings and the other
animals which it is appropriate to
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acknowledge by treating human suffer
ing as far more important than animal
suffering.
But is this what we are really
doing? Are we simply recognizing a
morally relevant difference between
human beings and animals - that human
beings are more intelligent than
animals - adding the premise that the
suffering of a less intelligent being
counts less, and making the obvious
deduction? If we really accepted
this principle, we would treat the
suffering of people of average
intellect as in itself less important
than the suffering of highly intelli
gent people, and the suffering of the
retarded 'as even less important. But
surely this would be wrong. Imagine
having someone who is far more
intelligent than yourself tell you
that, because of your inferior
intelligence, your pain should count
less than his, or imagine someone
suggesting that since some very
retarded people seem less intelligent
than some dogs upon whom we experi
ment, we should feel as free to
experiment on such retarded human
beings as we now do on dogs or guinea
pigs or rats.
It might be argued that even
though some human beings such as
babies and some retarded persons are
less intelligent than the most
intelligent animals, human beings
are characteristically more intelli
gent than animals and that this
justifies treating babies and persons
who are unusually retarded with far
more concern for their pain than we
would show if they were animals.
But this argument still relies on
the assumption that the pain of more
intelligent creatures counts more
heavily than that of less intelligent
ones, an assumption whose full
implications we are obviously
unwilling to accept. Also, even if
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that were correct, why should we treat
creatures who are not intelligent as
though they were intelligent simply
because they belong to a species most
of whose other members are intelligent?
It could be replied that we have a
precedent for doing so in those
insurance companies that treat young
people who are unusually safe drivers
for their age-group as though they
were no safer than the average for
their age-group. However, I think we
would either regard this practice as
unjustifiable or, if we find it justi
fiable, we do so only because the
insurance companies claim that they
lack sufficient evidence to determine
which young drivers are the safe ones,
and that collecting such evidence
would cost too much to be feasible.
But in the case of babies and the
mentally retarded, there is no problem
in determining their relative lack of
intelligence.
Another argument for counting
animal pain far less heavily than
human pain is that we can be bound by
agreements with other human beings
not to cause them pain, but we cannot
be bound by such agreements with
animals because they can't make
agreements. We could, however, be
bound by agreements with animal
lovers not to inflict suffering on
animals. More important, we quite
properly feel that it is wrong to
inflict suffering on other human
beings even when we haven't agreed
not to do so, either with them or with
any other people. Suppose that you
found an island inhabited by a tribe
of people with whom neither you nor
anyone in your society had made any
agreements, that it was in your
interest to do something that would
cause them great distress, and that
doing that thing would help you far
less than it would harm them.
Suppose that you proposed doing it
and that someone protested that it
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would be wrong. It wouldn't do for
you to reply that your proposed
behavior would be perfectly all right
because you were bound by no agree
ments with the tribe. Thus it would
appear that you can have an obliga
tion not to cause pain even if you
aren't bound by an agreement not to
do so, so this argument fails.
How do we know that animals can
feel pain?
It might be argued that we needn't
worry about causing animals pain
because we don't know that they are
capable of feeling pain, or indeed,
that they have any experiences at
all. After all, the most you can do
is hear an animal whimper or howl, or
see it grimace or tremble or recoil
or run away. Ydu can't actually feel
the animal's pain so you can't verify
the claim that it is suffering;
consequently, there is no need to act
as if it is capable of suffering.
But the same holds true of human
beings. You can only see the outward
signs of their suffering. You can
only feel your own pain, not theirs;
yet we don't believe that because of
this it is morally acceptable to act
as if other human beings never have
painful experiences. But what
justification do we have for suppos
ing that other human beings have
experiences more or less similar to
our own? The most commonly employed
argument is known as the argument
from analogy for other minds. It is
argued that in your own case you
notice on innumerable occasions that
certain kinds of behavior are
associated with certain kinds of
experiences, and that since you
observe other people behaving in ways
similar to your own, you are entitled
to infer that they have experiences
that are similar to your own. When
you are burned, you feel pain and
you engage in pain-behavior, e.g.,
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you flinch if the burn is
etc., so that it is reason
able to infer that when other people
are burned and engage in pain
behavior, they, too, feel pain.
Further, the argument can be strength
ened by determining that other people
have nervous systems similar to your
own.
grimace~

nervous system.

touched~

An argument very like this can
be used to show that animals have
various kinds of feelings, particular
ly pain. They have similar nervous
systems to ours, and when they are
subjected to stimuli that we find
painful, they typically engage in
kinds of behavior analogous to our
own: for example, cattle react to
branding irons in much the same way
in which we would react to branding
irons.
This is a good point at which to
answer a fairly common objection to
vegetarianism. It is suggested that
if we are to care about the feelings
of animals, why shouldn't we care
about the feelings of plants as well?
But if we had to worry about the
feelings of plants, we would have to
give up eating them as well as
animals, and, if we did, we would die
of starvation. But this line of
reasoning assumes that we have good
grounds for supposing that plants
can have experiences and~ in parti
cular, painful experiences. Does
the argument from analogy support
this? I think not. It is dubious
whether it makes sense to say that
plants behave at all (unless you are
using "behave" in a metaphorical
sense), and even if it does make
sense to say they behave, their
behavior is too different from that
of human beings to support the
argument from analogy. Furthermore,
plants don't have central nervous
systems, and the evidence strongly
suggests that pain is only felt
when there is an effect on a central

But even if plants can feel pain 
if they suffer when they are harvest
ed, for instance - vegetarianism
would still seem to be better than
our present meat-eating practices
because you don't need to harvest as
much grain to feed people if you give
it to them directly as you do if it
is fed to animals and then eaten.
You can feed a number of times as
many people using grain directly as
you can if you feed it to ~nimals
and then use them as meat. l Many
philosophers don't think that the
argument from analogy is successful,2
and they give alternative justifica
tions for the claim that other human
beings have minds. These other
justifications, however, would seem
to work as well to show that animals
have minds as they do to show that
other human beings do.
Are experiments ever justifiable
without the subject's consent?
If there is no good reason for
regarding animal suffering as less
important than human suffering, a
minimum requirement for the justifi
cation of an animal experiment is
that it either (1) be reasonable to
expect that the experiment will cause
less suffering than it will prevent;
or (2) that, even if it is likely
that the particular experiment will
fail, the enormous gain in prevent
ing future suffering that would be
made if it were successful makes the
gamble worthwhile even when the
animal suffering caused by the
experiment is taken into account.
This requirement would almost
certainly eliminate most animal
experiments, but there would clearly
remain a considerable number of
experiments in which it would be
reasonable to suppose that the
requirement would be satisfied. Are
any other requirements in order?

so
In the case of human beings, it is some
times regarded as obvious that no human
being should ever be experimented on
without his own consent. This may not
be as obvious as it seems, but for
the time being let's accept it. In
the case of human beings, one can
sometimes get consent by offering a
reward that will lead the subject to
accept the risk and distress of the
experiment, and there are also some
people who will consent for idealistic
reasons, who are willing to make a
personal sacrifice in the hope of
preventing or alleviating the suffering
of others. But in the case of
animals, getting consent is out of the
question: you can't explain the
dangers to them, you can't explain the
object of the experiment, and you
can't tell them about the reward you
propose to give them. And if none of
these things can be explained to an
animal, it obviously isn't going to
consent. Does this mean that all
experiments on animals are morally
wrong, even those that make sense
when the suffering of all sentient
beings is taken into account?
Consider the matter of rewards. If a
child is unable to understand the
possible reward for taking a certain
risk or for undergoing certain
suffering, we sometimes feel justified
in forcing him to do so because it is
for his or her own good. If, for
example, a child needs a painful
operation, we may feel entitled to
perform it without his or her consent
provided we are in a better position
to determine what is in the child's
long-term interests than he or she is.
Could a similar situation arise with
animals? In the case of the child,
the good things come after the bad
thing (the operation) rather than
before it. This condition can't be
met for an animal if the experiment
will result in its death. Still, not
all animal experiments are expected to
end in death; sometimes there is no
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danger of death, and sometimes the
danger is low enough so that it would
be reasonable for an animal to take
the risk involved, provided an
adequate reward were given afterwards.
In such cases, there could be moral
grounds for conducting the animal
experiment without its consent which
were as good as those for performing
the operation on the child. It is,
of course, more difficult to think of
rewards for animals than for human
beings. For human beings it is easy:
most of us want a great many things
that money can buy. Still, even
though it is hard to think of adequate
rewards for animals, it should be
possible with a bit of ingenuity. For
example, if you captured an animal in
a place that provided a poor environ
ment for it because the food supply
was inadequate, or because it didn't
provide the animal with an opportunity
to engage in some of its natural
activities, you could as a reward move
it after the experiment to a more
suitable environment. Or if an animal
was likely to be exposed to a certain
disease, the reward could be an
inoculation against it. If the
experiment wasn't very risky, the
animal's prospects for survival might
be better with the whole package
involving the risk of the experiment
and the protection of the inoculation
than they would be without it.
But in the case of many experi
ments, the animal is likely to die or
to be so much worse off because of
the effects of the experiment that
nothing you could do for him after
the experiment would leave him as
well off then as he would have been
if you had left him alone. If we
felt that such experiments could
never be conducted, we would be
barred from performing many experi
ments that can be expected to pre
vent a great deal more suffering
than they would cause, so this is a
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matter that deserves careful considera
tion. An important thing to note is
that most animals that are subjected
to experiments are bred for that
very purpose. If it were not for the
animal breeders, the parents of the
future subjects of experiments would
not have mated with one another, or
at the very least, would have mated
at different times. For this reason
the animals destined to be subjects
of many, and perhaps most, fatal
experiments would not have existed
at all if someone hadn't planned to
perform those experiments. A large
portion of animals now raised for
experiments would have been better
off if they had never been born. But
this could be changed. It is possible
to raise animals to be used for
experiments in such a way that their
lives as a whole, though shorter than
the normal life of an animal of
their species, would be better than
no life at all. Insisting on such
a requirement would, of course, make
such experiments a good deal more
expensive but from the point of view
of those of us who stand to benefit
from such experiments, that would be
much better than banning them
altogether. There is the further
advantage that it would give experi
menters a financial incentive to
think twice before subjecting animals
to fatal experiments.
Would such an arrangement really
provide us with a satisfactory way
out of the moral dilemma with which
we seemed to be confronted? Would
it enable us to carryon those
experiments that make sense in terms
of the overall goal of decreasing
the suffering of sentient beings with
out infringing on what might be taken
to be a basic right - the right to
protection from experiments that
could not be made part of a package
that it would be reasonable for the
subject to accept? The argument in
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favor of the experimenter would be
that in giving the animal a good life
before the experiment (when it
wouldn't otherwise have had any life
at all), he is conferring a benefit
that outweighs the harm that comes
later. It might be objected that
you aren't benefiting an animal when
you give it life, even if the life
is on the whole worth living. But
why not? Surely it makes sense to
say that you are glad that you were
born? And it won't do to object
that it doesn't make sense to compare
existence with non-existence, because
it does make sense to compare being
alive with being dead and to express
a strong preference for being alive.
It might be objected, too, that it
is wrong to bring something into the
world under a sentence of death.
But we are all under sentence of
death: we are all mortal. The
objection can be re-stated: it is
wrong to bring anything into the
world under sentence of an unnatural
death. It can also be argued that
the experimenter was guilty of
"species ism" in that he was prepared
to do something to animals that he
would not be willing to do to human
beings. Clearly we wouldn't be
willing to bring human beings into
the world to serve as subjects of
fatal experiments. Are we guilty of
species ism then if we are willing to
do this to animals?
I believe that in this case we
are not because there are a number of
morally relevant differences. First
of all, if we had such a practice
regarding adult human beings or even
relatively young children, the people
who were to serve as subjects for
such experiments would know what was
in store for them whereas animals
do not and are therefore spared the
mental anguish human beings would
suffer in anticipation. Secondly,
although I have argued that animal
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pain is not less important than that
of human beings, this is perfectly
compatible with holding that it is
far more important to preserve the
lives of human beings than the lives
of animals because human beings
characteristically have far richer
lives than animals. Thirdly, because
it is more important to preserve
human and animal lives, it is desir
able for us to have particularly
strong feelings of revulsion towards
the killing of innocent human
beings. 3
Two final points should be made.
First, it is important to determine
whether animal experiments involving
suffering or death are always wrong,
or whether at least a small fraction
of them are justifiable because it
is almost certain that if one bars
all such experiments, at least some
discoveries that would prevent more
suffering than is caused to the
animal in terms of the overall goal
of minimizing suffering for all
sentient beings will be blocked. If
one grants that animal experimenta
tion (even that which results in
the animal's death) may be justifiable
where it would prevent more suffer
ing than the experiment causes, one
is no longer open to the most
plausible objection of those who
support our present laboratory
practices. Secondly, it is now
possible to obtain much of the infor
mation that has hitherto been gained
from experimenting on animals by
alternative techniques which are not
only more accurate and reliable but
frequently less expensive. Obviously
these developments should be
publicized, particularly because the
large industry which has developed
for breeding experimental animals
has a natural interest in opposing
the use of alternative techniques.
Do the interests of human beings

always take precedence over the
interests of animals?
It has been claimed that although
the interests of animals should be
respected, the answer to this question
is obviously "yes". On first glance,
this seems eminently reasonable. 4
After all, it is admitted that the
interests of animals should be
respected and surely it is no more
than commonsense to suppose that when
there is a conflict between the
interests of human beings and animals,
the interests of human beings should
take precedence. And think of the
advantages to be gained from recogniz
ing this. In the preceding discussion
of animal experiments, it was argued
that experiments designed to test
the safety of new luxury goods such
as cosmetics should be abandoned,
that we should simply give up those
luxury goods. But that would mean
not merely that some women would have
to do without certain new cosmetics,
it would also mean that people
wouldn't be employed making and
selling them. But if it is agreed
that the interests of human beings
should always take precedence over
the interests of animals, women
could have new cosmetics and
cosmetic-workers their jobs. But can
we really accept the principle that
whenever there is a conflict between
human and animal interests, human
interests should prevail, no matter
how much animal suffering would be
required? Consider the tasty liver
paste known as pate de foie gras.
In order to make it, geese are force
fed until their livers burst. Or
consider boiled crabs and lobsters.
The common practice is to place them,
still alive, in boiling water, and
there is good evidence now available
to show that they do not die
instantaneously or painlessly, but go
on suffering for several minutes.
{Putting them in tepid water and
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bringing it slowly to boil does not
help; it prolongs the process.) In
both these cases our present practices
serve the interest of human beings so
the principle of giving human interests
precedence is forced to sanction them.
The obvious conclusion is that the
principle is wrong.
Would animals be worse off in a
world of vegetarians?
Consider the following rhetorical
question: "If everyone became a
vegetarian, would there still be any
sheep or cattle in the world, well
cared for and guarded against
starvation?" The obvious answer is
that probably very few of them would
exist unless they were kept as pets.
Left to themselves, they would be
hard put to it to survive. Further
more, even if some sheep and cattle
would exist in a vegetarian world,
a great many more who would have
been raised for food in a meat-eating
world would never be born.
Now suppose that these animals
that would never be born in a
vegetarian world had been born and
were given lives that were worth
living before they were killed for
meat. Isn't it better that they
should have been born and given
shortened lives than that they should
have no life at all? If this is so,
then isn't it better, even from the
point of view of the animals who will
eventually be eaten, that the world
should not become vegetarian? Isn't
it in fact wrong to encourage
vegetarianism because, insofar as you
are successful, you will prevent the
existence of animals who would
otherwise be born and live relatively
happy (although shortened) lives?
There are two main objections to
this. First, the argument rests on
the supposition that animals raised
for meat are characteristically given
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relatively happy lives and, in a world
in which factory-farming is increas
ingly common, that supposition is
debatable, to say the least. Secondly,
the argument rests on the supposition
that it is wrong (or at least prima
facie wrong) to prevent the existence
of beings that would have happy lives.
Holding this view does not require
you to hold that it is always wrong
to practise birth control or even
that it is always wrong to have an
abortion because there might be
countervailing factors that make
abortion or birth control acceptable
or even obligatory. In an over
populated world, such countervailing
factors are increasingly likely to
be present. Overpopulation also
provides a reason for not raising
animals for meat because when you do
so you get only a fraction as much
food value from the meat as you would
get if the grain needed to raise the
animal had been given directly to
human beings.
Because of the last consideration
alone, it seems that even if it is
prima facie wrong to encourage
vegetarianism (thereby preventing the
existence of relatively happy
animals), when everything is taken
into consideration it may not be
wrong on the whole to do so, and it
may even be obligatory. Still the
question remains as to whether it is
at least prima facie wrong to prevent
the existence of animals who would
have relatively happy lives. In
considering this question, it will be
useful to construct an imaginary case
in which the claim that it would be
wrong to prevent the existence of
animals even though they are eventu
ally to be killed will be made as
strong as possible. Let's suppose,
first, thgt there is no food shortage
so that we can ignore the claim that
grain used to feed animals should be
given instead directly to human
beings. Let's confine ourselves to
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those animals who couldn't survive on
their own, and let's suppose that
instead of raising them on factory
farms, they are given an idyllic
existence. Let's suppose further
that the only way in which it is
commercially feasible to raise them
is for food. Imagine that a reformer
makes the proposal that these animals
are not to be killed for meat but that,
since society cannot afford to take
care of them, they be allowed to fend
for themselves. Clearly, this would
not be in the animals' interest
(since the case stipulates that they
cannot survive on their own),
whereas if they were not set free,
most of them would enjoy many more
years of an agreeable life (even
though they had to die at the end of
it) .

Now suppose instead that a
farmer proposes that he breed some
pigs, and that he agrees to give
them a good life and as humane a
death as he can contrive, provided
he is allowed to hutcher them
eventually. It is hard to see why
even someone particularly concerned
with the pigs' welfare should oppose
his plan. After all, this batch of
pigs will not be born if they aren't
meant to be butchered. Wouldn't
the pigs, once they were born, be
glad (if they could understand the
situation) that they had been born
even if a necessary condition for
their life is eventual death? After
all, we are all going to die, and
most of us will die much worse deaths
than these animals.
Still, it might be replied that
in order for it to be wrong to
prevent the birth of someone, you must
have an obligation to him, and you
can't have an obligation to a non
existent being. But consider the
following case. Because a prospective
mother has an abnormal condition, any
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child she conceives who is allowed to
be born will have a wretched life.
Such a person would surely have an
obligation to prevent the conception
of such a child. Surely it would be
wrong to conceive it, and wrong, if
it were conceived, to allow it to be
born. This seems to show either
that we can have obligations to
non-existent beings or, at the very
least, that it can be wrong to do
certain things because of their
effects on non-existent beings. (If
it is objected that what makes the
conception wrong is not the baby's
suffering but the trouble it will
cause others, the example could be
changed by specifying that the child's
case be of medical interest; this
benefit to others will offset the
trouble to them so that in this case
conceiving the child would be wrong
only because of that child's
suffering. )
Consider the following argument:
1. It is morally bad per se to
add miserable creatures to the world.
2. Suppose that it is not morally
good per se to add happy creatures to
the world.
3. Then it is not morally per
missible to add a group of creatures
to the world (taking only the group's
welfare into account) if some
members of the group are miserable,
no matter how many are happy.
4. But it is permissible to add
such a group (taking only their
welfare into account) if enough of
them will be happy.
5. Therefore it is morally good
per se to add happy creatures to
the world.
A number of objections have been
raised to this argument. (I should
say before describing the controversy
that it has been carried on in terms
of people rather than the broader
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category including animals as well and
I will describe it in terms of people,
but the arguments apply equally well
to animals.) Bennett claims that we
don't need the happiness of the happy
offspring to balance against the
unhappiness of the miserable ones;
that we can use instead the antici
pated gain in happiness for the
parents. S Bennett raised this
objection against a version of the
argument in which it was not as
apparent as it is in the present
version that only the interests of
those added to the world are taken
into consideration. Clearly his
objection wouldn't work against this
version. 6 William Anglim suggests on
the other hand that the argument only
shows that it is a supererogatory
good deed to add happy creatures to
the wor1d. 7 Anglim raised this
objection within a utilitarian frame
work, and I responded 8 that within
such a framework it wouldn't count as
supererogatory to add happy people to
the world unless doing so is good in
itself. For a utilitarian, an action
couldn't be supererogatory unless it
had a good consequence. It would be
supererogatory because it demanded
an undue amount of sacrifice from
the agent in comparison with the
value of the consequence for others;
rather than because it was not a
good thing to bring about that sort
of consequence. Michael Bayles
misinterprets the argument taking its
conclusion to be that we can have
obligations concerning possible
persons and objects that the premiss
to the effect that it is morally bad
to make possible miserable persons
actual assumes the consequent. 9 But
the argument is directed to philoso
phers who, like Bayles himself,
suppose that it is a bad thing to make
miserable possible persons actual. A
philosopher who rejected that premiss
would suppose that the argument was
unsound but it's a difficult premiss

to reject.
I know of no successful refutation
to this argument. 10 Still, the over
all argument against vegetarianism
would not succeed unless it could be
shown that the majority of animals
bred for food would probably be given
happy lives, and this seems unlikely.
Furthermore, it is very difficult in
an overpopulated world in which many
people are starving to justify
feeding animals to make them into
food, when giving grain directly to
human beings would feed several times
as many as could be fed with the
slaughtered animals. The opponent
of vegetarianism may succeed in show
ing that vegetarianism is prima facie
wrong because it would prevent the
existence of some happy animals.
However, that is not enough to show
that it is wrong on the whole
because it would probably also pre
vent the births of a much larger
number of unhappy animals. Finally,
even if he should satisfy us as to
the welfare of animals, he would
still have to convince us that the
overall benefit to animals would
exceed the harm done to human beings
by producing food in an extremely
inefficient way when millions of
people are starving.
Can animals have rights?
Some people suppose that not only
do animals lack certain rights, but
they are incapable of having any
rights at all. Most of these people
would nevertheless think that we have
an obligation not to do certain things
to animals (such as torturing them)
and many of them would hold that we
have obligations to do certain things
for animals. This is important
because having rights is only an
advantage insofar as it gives others
the obligation to do certain things
for you and to refrain from doing
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certain other things to you. For
instance, there would be no advan
tage in having the right to freedom
of speech in religious matters if no
one had an obligation to refrain from
preventing you from speaking about
your religious beliefs. Or, to take
another example, there would be no
advantages for Canadians in having
the right to freedom from hunger
unless some other people had (or in
some situation would have) an obliga
tion to provide needy Canadians with
food.
It is commonly felt that certain
rights should be respected no matter
what the circumstances, e.g., the
right never to be punished when you
are innocent or the right never to be
tortured. There are many people who
would feel however that, in extreme
circumstances, even such basic rights
as these may be violated. (Mightn't
it be justifiable, for example, to
torture one person if the only
alternative was letting a great many
people be tortured?)
There are also rights that most
of us would agree can be overridden
in abnormal situation: for example,
the right to be told the truth or the
right to have promises kept. And
finally, there are rights that are
fairly commonly overridden, such. as
the right to an advanced education
for those who are sufficiently
talented to benefit by it. In a
society that is not particularly
affluent, the obligation of the state
to provide such an education for some
citizens may be overridden by its
obligation to provide for the more
basic needs of other citizens. It
is important to remember that there
are these weaker sorts of rights as
well as (possibly) the strongest sort
of right (those which can never be
overridden) because even if one doesn't
grant that animals can have the
strongest sort of right, it doesn't
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follow that they have no rights at
all.
Turning back to the relation
between rights and obligations
towards those who have rights, imagine
two people who agree on what obliga
tions we have to animals (what things
we have obligations to do for them,
and what things we have obligations
not to do to them), but who disagree
on whether animals have rights or
not. For an animal concerned with
his own welfare, it wouldn't matter
which of these two positions is taken.
Or suppose that Jones thinks that we
have more obligations towards animals
than Smith does, but that Smith
believes that animals have rights
while Jones does not. An animal with
an eye to his own interest would
prefer to have people believe what
Jones does, despite the fact that he
thinks animals have no rights. More
concretely, suppose that Jones thinks
that even though animals have no
rights, we should never kill or
torture them while Smith thinks that
animals have a right not to be
tortured but that it is permissible
to kill them. A friend of animals
would be well-advised to prefer
Jones' view, the no-rights view,
because the consequences of accept
ing Smith's view would obviously be
far worse for animals. I myself
believe that where there are rights
there are corresponding obligations,
and, conversely, that where there are
obligations there are corresponding
rights (though this requires defense
which is beyond the scope of this
paper.) At any rate, the crucial
thing for animal welfare is that we
have some obligations to them.
Some philosophers who think that
animals have no rights but that we
have obligations to them think that
these obligations are based on the
fact that animals have interests.
Although I disagree with the claim
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that animals lack rights, this theory
does at least allow for the proper
treatment of animals. Others who
think that animals have no rights
think that our obligations towards
them are based, not on their interests
but (1) on agreements with other human
beings (and, further, that agreements
are the only source of rights and
obligations); or (2) on the need to
preserve our own good character.
Theory (1) grounds all rights
and obligations on agreements: in
order to have a right, you must either
have made an agreement giving you that
right, or you must at least be
capable of making such an agreement.
An objectionable consequence of (1) is
that it leaves not only animals but
babies and the insane with no rights.
Even so, since we can still have
obligations towards them, it is
perhaps enough. But there is still
an unacceptable consequence of (1).
Suppose that in a given society no
one cared about the welfare of the
insane or infants, and that there
was no agreement, for example, that
they should not be tortured. It
would follow that in that society it
would not merely not be regarded as
wrong to torture babies and the
insane, it wouldn't be wrong.
As for view (2), that we have
obligations towards animals because
treating them badly is injurious to
one's character rather than because
it is injurious to animals, the
claim would seem to be that one won't
have the sort of character that will
lead to treating human beings well
unless one has the sort of character
that leads to treating animals well.
But this is surely false: many people
who have been models of virtue in
their treatment of other human beings
have done or allowed others to do
dreadful things to animals. One can
unfortunately be virtuous towards
the members of some in-group while
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glVlng no thought to the members of
an out-group. (This is, of course,
also a problem for the dealings
of human beings with each other, and
an important kind of moral progress
consists in making the boundaries of
what one takes to be the in-group
broader and broader - to include not
only one's family, one's town, one's
country, all mankind, but, fpr animal
liberation, to include all sentient
beings. )
Why should I become a vegetarian?
Some readers may feel that while
it would be desirable for our society
as a whole to become vegetarian,
nothing can be gained by particular
individuals becoming vegetarian so
that they personally have no obliga
tion to do so. A similar argument
could have been given to defend the
owning of slaves, and, if everyone had
accepted it, the institution of
slavery would almost certainly have
survived. It's theoretically
possible, of course, that people who
took advantage of slavery while it
existed would still have voted for
its abolition. Still, it is unlikely
that a society of slave-owners would
vote for the abolition of slavery,
and the same holds for a society of
meat-eaters and the abolition of
raising animals for meat. Further
more, if in becoming a vegetarian you
show that a vegetarian can have a
healthy and enjoyable diet, your
example tends to encourage others.
And the more vegetarians there are,
the easier it is to be one because
they create a demand for vegetarian
restaurants and grocery stores. Also,
when people act in accord with certain
moral beliefs, they characteristically
become more deeply committed to those
beliefs. In the case of animal
rights, it is particularly important
that we should be deeply concerned
because, unlike homosexuals or women
or racial minorities, animals are
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dumb: they literally cannot speak
for their own rights and so we should
speak for them.
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world would be inferior to the world
with which they began so the view
that it is a good thing to add happy
people to the world must be mistaken .
The view that we should aim at a world
with the highest possible average level
of happiness avoids the objectionable
conclusion (Derek Par fit calls it "the
repugnant conclusion") but it has the
grossly counterintuitive consequence
that under certain circumstances it
would be wrong to add happy people
to the world even if doing so would
raise the happiness level of all those
already there. I have argued that all
other views that are at all plausible
have a consequence that is closely
analagous to the repugnant conclusion
and that is, i f anything, more
objectionable than it is. McMahan
questions this analogy in his review
of Obligations to Future Generations
in the October 1981 issue of Ethics
to which I respond in the same issue.
The main theme of my argument is
that if it isn't a good thing to add
happy people to the world and if there
were a few people with a very low level
of happiness in the world who could
either help each other to be a bit
better off or bring about a new race
of very happy people, they should do
the former rather than the latter
and thus leave us with a miserable
world rather than a happy one. It is
unfortunately impossible to develop
this response properly without
devoting more space to it. I have
attempted here to briefly suggest the
lines of present controversy which,
although they have been carried on
specifically in terms of people
apply equally well to animals.
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